Ex-aide pens mostly positive account of White House years for elder Bush

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“The Leadership of George Bush” by Roman Popadiuk; Texas A&M University Press ($30)

By CARL P. LEUBSDORF

The Dallas Morning News

Unlike most recent presidents, the elder George Bush chose not to write his memoirs, leaving it to others to evaluate his tenure.

The latest to do so, his former deputy press secretary Roman Popadiuk, has produced an affectionate and relatively honest account that mixes rather academic descriptions of how the White House functioned with more-interesting accounts of how Bush handled major issues.

If not riveting reading, it gives a good overall sense of his presidency.

Mechanics of leadership

Popadiuk concludes criticism of Bush’s leadership stemmed largely from his shortcomings at the “mechanics of leadership, such as communications skills, articulating an agenda and dealing with institutions, rather than actual leadership.” He says history will conclude “Bush exhibited great leadership,” enabling his standing to rise with time.

Popadiuk validates that in discussing foreign policy. But he shows Bush’s failure to exert domestic leadership contributed to his re-election defeat.

Though he has worked for Bush for two decades and now runs the foundation that organizes exhibits at Bush’s presidential library, his account is not totally positive.

“Bush failed to grasp and to fully utilize the strength of the bully pulpit and the importance of presidential rhetoric in stirring and persuading the public,” he writes, adding Bush did not fit a world in which “politics was becoming more of a media show.”

Letdown by top aides

Popadiuk blames top White House aides for problems Bush encountered by reversing his 1988 promise to avoid tax increases and failing to move quickly against the 1991-92 economic recession.

He credits the controversial 1990 budget agreement, which included tax increases, with fueling the economic boom of the 1990s and says “the great failure of the budget deal was in how it was presented to the public.”

Bush failed to explain the importance of cutting the deficit, while Chief of Staff John Sununu and Budget Director Richard Darman “failed to keep other parts of the White House informed” so they could sell it, he writes.

He mainly blames Sununu for Bush’s failure to take advantage of his great popularity after the 1991 Persian Gulf War to present a significant domestic program, especially on health care.

When Bush finally addressed the slump in his 1992 State of the Union speech, he presented “a warmed-over listing of all the points that he had been advocating throughout the years. And many of these points did not resonate with the average American.”

By then, Bush was in political trouble. And the May 1991 illness diagnosed as a thyroid problem “appeared to drain some of his energy and intensity.”

When his 1992 campaign foundered from disorganization and lack of focus, “Bush took no action to rectify the situation; he was fully expecting advisers to set the right course.

Sins of the son

Bush’s presidential son appears only fleetingly, but Popadiuk’s recitation of the father’s foreign-policy principles sound like implicit criticisms of the son’s later decisions.

“For Bush, it was important for the world not to view the United States as an arrogant power,” he writes. He realized “a unilateral course of action by the United States ran the risk of isolating the nation diplomatically, creating unfavorable international perceptions and, ultimately, undermining U.S. goals.”

By concentrating blame on Sununu, Popadiuk sometimes overlooks Bush’s ultimate responsibility. But he correctly portrays the underlying decency and character that continues to make the 41st president a figure of respect.